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Abstract

Shrinking budgets and dynamic military conflicts have driven Department of
Defense (DoD) leadership to reform how the military acquires weapon systems with the
goal of decreasing program schedules and costs, while maximizing performance. Yet
with more than fifty years of acquisition reform, the DoD has been unable to adequately
control program schedule objectives. Previous research attempted to support acquisition
reform through computer modeling and simulation. One model, called the Enterprise
Requirements and Acquisition Model (ERAM), captures a program’s progression through
the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) to gain insight into significant
delays that impact a program’s schedule and probability of completion. A past
unexpected result included the insignificant impact that Developmental Test and
Evaluation (DT&E) activities had to a program’s overall schedule. This ERAM research
improves the fidelity of the Air Force (AF) DT&E activities through data collection,
subject matter expert (SME) feedback, computer modeling and simulation, and Monte
Carlo analysis. Interventions included modifying the probability of passing the Test
Readiness Review, System Verification Review, decreasing the maximum delay to a
program’s first test mission, improvements in Responsible Test Organization resource
availability, test item quality, and test item quantity. Several interventions significantly
reduced major program schedule by 15% or 21 months. The research demonstrates a
methodology for quantitatively supporting acquisition reform interventions by
characterizing key DT&E activities and delay factors.
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I. Introduction

The political and economic environment the United States (US) found itself in
during the beginning of the twenty first century forced the Department of Defense (DoD)
to research new methods to improve the processes by which the US military acquires its
weapons systems. The ability to observe system level impacts of acquisition reforms
could assist leadership in making reforms which not only have local process benefits, but
positively impact the entire system. This thesis focuses on refining previous research
efforts in an attempt to provide Air Force (AF) senior leadership a different capability to
assist in addressing acquisition reform.
General Issue
As technology advanced during the 21st century, it was integrated into military
weapon systems increasing the time required to produce them. Efforts to evolve an
effective acquisition process culminated into the 2008 DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02
which was the official instruction on conducting DoD acquisitions and is summarized in
the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management
System Chart in Figure 1. Pending modification to DoDI 5000.02 have been proposed at
the time of writing this thesis (USD, 2013).
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Figure 1: DoD Acquisitions (DAU, 2013)
As complicated as the weapon systems being obtained, the process to acquire
these systems can be viewed as equally complex. DoD leadership formally acknowledged
problems with how the military produces weapon systems in the Hoover Study conducted
in 1949 and since then over 128 acquisition studies have been conducted (Kadish, 2005).
Even with over 60 years of evolution, the acquisition process has not consistently
performed at an acceptable level (Eide, 2012). From a recent Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report, programs in the 2012 acquisition portfolio were on average more
than two years behind schedule (2013). The consistent findings in many similar reports
combined with the economic crisis the US found itself in during the beginning of the
twenty-first century has captured senior DoD leadership’s interest in acquisition reform.
Both President Obama and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Hagel have addressed the
2

issue. President Obama expressed his concern, that the US could no longer afford
acquisition’s poor performance and must become more efficient in delivering weapon
systems to the warfighter (Obama, 2009), by signing into law the Weapons System
Acquisition Reform Act in 2009. The President’s viewpoint was supported by SECDEF
Hagel’s who expressed his concern during a speech at the National Defense University in
2013.
“We need to continually move forward with designing an acquisition
system that responds more efficiently, effectively and quickly to the needs
of troops and commanders in the field. One that rewards cost-effectiveness
and efficiency, so that our programs do not continue to take longer, cost
more, and delivers less than initially planned and promised.”
Problem Statement
Joseph R. Wirthlin investigated the Defense Acquisition Management System
(DAMS) for complex relationships which could be causing emergent behaviors within
the system. Wirthlin postulated that acquisition reform may have been implemented
without the ability to accurately predict system impacts due to these complex
relationships. Wirthlin (2009) recognized the opportunity for research in this area and
became the focus of his dissertation. His research created the Enterprise Requirements
Acquisition Model (ERAM), an extensive simulation model of the DAMS. The purpose
of ERAM was to investigate the DAMS process relationships in order to characterize
how the system worked, why it behaved the way it did, and if there were ways to improve
it. ERAM provided the capability to simulate policy reforms in the simulation model and
3

observe the system impacts. Due to the complexity of the DAMS, many low level
processes were purposefully abstracted. Wirthlin discovered several unexpected results in
his dissertation and suggested them as areas for future research including: the Test
Readiness Review (TRR), Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), and System
Verification Review (SVR) activities (Wirthlin, 2009: 189-190). These three areas will be
the focus of this thesis.
Investigative Questions
The following questions were identified for this thesis:
1. How can the fidelity of ERAM 1.0 DT&E activities be improved?
2. What insight can be gained from the improved fidelity ERAM with regard to
supporting previous research conclusions regarding the TRR, DT&E, and SVR
activities?
3. What DT&E process interventions can significantly reduce program schedule?
Impacts
The ability to simulate acquisition policy reform in a simulation model and
observe system level impacts, before implementing the policy in reality, could be useful
to DoD leadership. ERAM is not viewed by the author as a tool for DoD leadership to
directly use to make reforms. Rather, ERAM is viewed as a demonstration of how
computer modeling and simulation could be utilized to support acquisition reform. With
adequate resources, an advanced model, similar to ERAM, could be developed to as a
tool to support quantitative-based acquisition reform through computer modeling and
4

simulation. Lastly, ERAM could also be an educational tool for the Defense Acquisition
University to assist in teaching future acquisition professionals about the complex
relationships between process, technology, people, and the resulting emergent behaviors.

5

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
Chapter II is divided into several sections: Modeling and Simulation Overview,
ERAM, ERAM Evolution (2010-2013), DT&E’s Role in Program Schedule Delays, and
Literature Synthesis. The first section provides a brief introduction of modeling and
simulation focusing on its advantages, disadvantages, and limitations. The chapter will
continue with an in-depth review of the previous ERAM research. The Other Acquisition
Modeling Efforts section will be review other similar research projects. Chapter II
concludes by synthesizing key concepts from the extant literature.
Modeling and Simulation Overview
From automobile factory production lines to shipping distribution centers, these
collections of processes can be viewed as systems. Often there is desire to improve some
aspect of system performance such as decreasing production line down time or cycle
time. However, for complex systems, it may be difficult to estimate the impact changing
local variables will have on the entire system. The most direct way to observe system
impacts would be to implement the change in the actual system. This method is generally
not used because of the feasibility and potential financial loss should such a change result
in unintended negative consequences. Another method is to utilize modeling and
simulation. “A simulation is an abstraction of an operation in a real-world process or
system over time” (Banks, 2005: 3). Coupled with the computational capabilities of
computers, modeling and simulation enables system analysis difficult, if not impossible,
to attain from any other method. For example, in a simulation model, performance results
6

are directly traceable to changes the experimenter executed in the system. If acquisition
reform was instead executed in the DAMS in reality, it would be difficult to correlate
system improvements to the implemented reform because of the multitude of policy
reforms consistently enacted on a monthly basis. Figure 2-3 each presents a three year
timeline of DAMS reform implementation.

Figure 2: New DAMS Policy Reforms by Organization 2008-2011 (Milam, 2012)

7

Figure 3: Number of DAMS Policy Reforms from 2008-2011 (Milam, 2012)
The constant process change may result in a state of causal ambiguity where
policy reforms and system improvements are difficult to correlate with one another. In
addition, long DAMS program cycles would require years of observation before adequate
sample sizes are collected. With computer modeling and simulation, time is less of a
limiting factor as it can be manipulated. Data representing hundreds of years can be
collected in a few hours. Collecting the same information by observing the reality is
impossible.
As powerful as modeling and simulation can be, it should only be used in certain
situations. Four situations, directly relatable to this research project, are discussed below
(Banks, 2005: 4):
1. “The goal of the study or experimentation is the interactions of a complex system or
of a subsystem within a complex system.”
8

•

ERAM may be viewed as an investigation to characterize a complex system
(DAMS) and understand what impacts the subsystems ( DT&E activities) had
on the overall system (Wirthlin, 2009).

2. “The knowledge gained from a simulation model could be used to suggest
improvements in the real system.”
•

ERAM investigated interventions to identify process improvements which
could result in improved system performance in reality.

3. “Changing simulation inputs and observing the resulting outputs could produce
valuable insight into which variables are the most important and how those variables
interact.”
•

One of the main goals of ERAM and this research project was to observe what
changes in the system would result in system schedule performance benefits
(Wirthlin, 2009).

4. “Many modern systems are so complex (automobile factory, wafer fabrication plant)
that the internal interactions cannot be understood without the use of computer
simulation.”
•

Over sixty years of acquisition reform has failed to create a system which
adequately controls program schedule. This result may be, in part, due to the
system’s complexity hinting at the requirement to utilize computer simulation
to better characterize the system and its emergent behaviors.

9

ERAM
ERAM is a discrete event simulation model of acquisition category (ACAT) I, II,
and III which attempts to capture the “idea” of a program in pre-Milestone A all the way
to Milestone (MS) C. Included are the functional areas of the Joint Capabilities
Integration Development System (JCIDS), Acquisitions, the Planning Programming
Budgeting & Execution (PPBE), and Contractors. Created through investigation of
official policy and refined by SMEs, a single program progresses through the model.
Through Monte-Carlo analysis and the stochastic nature of the model, thousands of
potential outcomes are characterized to create a distribution of program schedule and
probability of successfully navigating DAMS up to MS C.
Validation of Arena Model
Model validation was conducted by comparing ERAM results to historical data.
Data were collected primarily from the System Metrics and Reporting Tool (SMART).
Student t-Tests compared ERAM results to the historical data. Specifically, the program
time from MSB to MSC, for different ACAT groups (all ACATS, ACAT I, ACAT II,
and ACAT III), was analyzed. Hypothesis testing indicated that ERAM was a valid
representation of the DAMS for all ACAT categories at a 95% confidence level
(Wirthlin, 2005: 138-146). The validation results of ERAM are important because they
will enable validity of this research project discussed in Chapter III.

10

ERAM Evolution (2010-2013)
Since 2009, other researchers have realized the potential benefits of utilizing
ERAM to investigate DAMS. These include work by Leach and Searle (2010),
Montomery (2011), and Baldus and others (2013). Below is a summary of their research
efforts.
Table 1: Overview of ERAM Research Projects
Author
Wirthlin

Leach and
Searle

Year
2009

2010

Montgomery

2011

Baldus and
others

2013

Version
Number
ERAM
1.0
ERAM
1.1
ERAM
1.2
ERAM
2.0
ERAM
2.1
ERAM
2.2

2.4

Simulation
Program

Changes

Arena

Baseline translation from Arena to ExtendSim

ExtendSim

Updates by the Aerospace Design Team and
served as new baseline model

ExtendSim

Implemented new DoD 5000.02 policies

ExtendSim

Incorporated the global variables that modify
acquisition capabilities

ExtendSim

Incorporated JCIDS review process

ExtendSim

Added more capabilities for ACAT II/III and
Rapid Acquisition Process

ExtendSim

Integrated space launch process delays

ERAM Research Vectors
Two research vectors were identified when reviewing the research in Table 1. The
original purpose of the ERAM was to improve understanding of how the DAMS operated
in order to conduct system level improvements. This research vector can be categorized
as improving system schedule performance. Since 2009, the focus shifted from system
schedule performance to prediction of a single program’s schedule. Figure 4 provides a
summary of previous ERAM research and their respective vectors.

11

Figure 4: ERAM Research Vectors
None of the projects listed in Table 1 addressed the DT&E areas of concern
identified by Wirthlin which presented the opportunity to proceed with either research
vector. The author was advised to “Go where the research interest is” by the research
committee and the author queried the acquisition community for input. Discussions with
SAF/AQXC, OUSD/ AT&L, and DAU indicated that the system schedule improvement
vector would be more relevant and directed this research project to investigation of the
DT&E activities in the original ERAM (ERAM 1.0) for the purpose of acquisition system
reform.
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Other Acquisition Modeling Efforts
Acquisition Document Development Model (ADDM)
Senior DoD leadership identified one problem in government acquisitions was
the lack of document control and listed seven document control issues (ASC/RCC, 2010:
2):
1. Milestone dates delayed due to non-timely document preparation.
2. Creating documents consumes a large amount of time and resources.
3. The rationale in tailoring program documents is not captured in a formal way.
4. There is no strong linkage between program documentation.
5. The quality and content is inconsistent across a program’s documents.
6. There is no capability to support cross-cutting changes to acquisition documents
with minimal effort.
7. A lack of insight into Milestone readiness
These issues were found to be especially prevalent when a program changed Program
Manager’s and were approaching a MS review. The AF created an interactive model,
called the Acquisition Document Development Model, capable of tracing program
documents and processes to address this issue. The four ADDM objectives were
(ASC/RCC, 2010:4):
1. Provide a roadmap that identifies what documents are required and when based
on a program’s ACAT level and MS.
2. Provide the ability for a PM to modify the program’s document roadmap to
meet specific program requirements.
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3. Provide a set of validated document templates which are linked to current
guidance, references, and Program Executive Officer (PEO) specific
instructions
4. Provide a quick, visual indicator on program review and Milestone document
status.
The intent of ADDM is to provide PM’s with document situational awareness
through several key model features. One such feature was that ADDM created a unique,
customized document roadmap based on the acquisition program’s ACAT level and the
next MS. Another feature was ADDM automatically created a set of standardized and
validated document templates according to the program’s roadmap. Each of these
documents was linked to the current policy and instruction. As a program progressed
through acquisitions, ADDM captured decisions and updated the program’s roadmap and
documents as required. In addition, ADDM was continuously updated to ensure the most
relevant information was accessible to PMs.
ADDM, as shown in Figure 5, provides PMs a tool, to assist in moving the
program from the current situation to the next MS review, listed the documents required
at the next MS review, provided standardized templates for documents, updated
document status, and provided current document guidance and instruction. Future plans
for ADDM include the addition of DoD space and business systems roadmaps.

14

Figure 5: ADDM (ASC/RCC, 2010: 8)
Acquisition Process Model (APM)
The DAMS can be viewed as a complex system of processes and the ability to
guide a program through the processes is critical to success. In 2009, the AF Acquisition
Chief Process Office initiated a project to create an official, authoritative process model
of the DAMS. The Acquisition Process Model was the culmination of their efforts. APM
provides an interactive process model for ACAT I programs from the point of view of the
Program Executive Officer (PEO) covering the DoD 5000 instruction, the JCIDS, and the
PPBE activities. APM’s goal is to provide a standardized, authoritative acquisition
process model with six objectives (ACPO, 2011):
1. Establish standard definition and activities associated with AF acquisition.
2. Provide process decomposition from Defense Acquisition Executive/Service
Acquisition Executive through PEO level actions.
3. Provide an integration context for other external/related process models.
15

4. Provide the process input to Acquisition Enterprise Architecture and other
Enterprise Architectures.
5. Provide a standard reference model for all stakeholders.
6. Provide a common context for process improvement initiatives.
APM utilizes an interactive model to capture document and process relationships
placing additional emphasis on the requirements generation (JCIDS), acquisitions (DoDI
5000.02 series), and funding (PPBE) activities. Key information (including process
definition, owner, reference document, performer, and links to current documentation) is
available for each process as shown in the APM preview in Figure 6.

Figure 6: APM Developmental Test (ACPO, 2011)
APM is updated on a routine basis to incorporate the current policies. Future plans
include improving model fidelity to the PM level processes.

16

Requirements and Acquisition Management Plan (RAMP)
Space system acquisition is different from conventional acquisitions in many
aspects as discussed in Air Force Instruction 99-103. However, space acquisition also
suffers from similar schedule problems observed in conventional acquisitions. The Air
Force Space Command’s Directorate of Requirements (AFSPC/A5) investigated the
space acquisitions and identified that quality and speed of requirements generation are
critical areas of concern (Gilchrist, 2011:24). AFSPC/A5 chose to use modeling as a
method of investigating these problems and created the Requirements and Acquisition
Management Plan.
The goal of RAMP is improve the requirements generation and acquisition
processes through a “standard, consistent, and transparent” requirements and acquisition
management process (Gilchrist, 2011:3). RAMP is a work breakdown structure tailored
for acquisitions which provide users the ability to schedule activities, assign
responsibilities, and access activity relationships. Figure 7 shows an example the RAMP
model.
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Process: RAMP Work Breakdown
Structure

> 30 days to start

<= 30 days until task start

task late

task begun

hyperlink

task complete

notes

DEFINING OUR FUTURE IN SPACE AND CYBERSPACE

task tailored out
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Figure 7: RAMP (Gilchrist, 2011:13)
Literature Synthesis
Chapter II provided several insights. The first insight was that modeling and
simulation are capable of providing insight into understanding complex process (DAMS)
when utilized appropriately. However, there are disadvantages inherent in all models and
the corresponding results must be analyzed by modeling and simulation experts who
understand these limitations. Another insight was that there are different methods (system
dynamics, agent based modeling, interactive charts, and other options) to model a system
and each method can provide a different viewpoint. All the research projects discussed in
Chapter II were modeling the same system but from different viewpoints. The different
methodologies were driven by the type of problem each model was addressing. The
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ADDM approached acquisition reform from a documents control perspective in order to
bring PMs situational awareness and control over the multitude of documents required
during procurement. APM provided PEOs a standardized, validated, and traceable model
of the DAMS processes. Requirements issues were addressed by RAMP through an
integrated, work schedule structure in order to decrease the requirements generation
schedule and increase quality. The DAMS suffers from diverse problems of which only a
very small sample were discussed here. However, as diverse as the problems encountered
were, a commonality among these research projects is that they used modeling as a
method for investigating a complex system.
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III. Methodology
Methodology
A simulation study methodology was utilized for this research. See the Appendix
for a figure of the methodology. The first step was reviewed in Chapters I and II. Chapter
III will address data collection and the iterative process of building a simulation model
and verifying the model. The remaining steps are addressed in Chapters IV and V.
Data Collection
There are two fundamental modeling constructs utilized in ERAM: processes and
decisions. Processes are tasks which take a stochastic amount of time to accomplish and
are modeled using triangular distributions. Decisions represent reviews where an entity
may progress through different model paths. Figure 8 contains graphical representations
of the two constructs encountered in ERAM. This area of ERAM was constructed with
three process blocks (represented by the rectangles) and a decision block (represented by
the diamond). The lines connecting the blocks represent the possible paths from one
process or decision to another and identify how an entity could progress through the
model. The model logic (in Figure 8) is from read left to right. A program (the entity)
enters the “Developmental Test and Evaluation” process block and a random number
from a triangular distribution will be randomly selected representing the time required to
perform the process. Next, the program progresses to the “Trades Needed” decision block
which will direct the entity to either the “Dev test rework and delay” or “Early
Operational Assessment” block based on the random value compared to a percent true
criteria. A program not requiring any rework will take the path around the “Dev test
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rework and delay” block (not incurring a delay due to accomplishing the blocks process)
and proceed to the “Early Operational Assessment” block. In this block, the program will
incur another process delay as specified by random number chosen from the block’s
distribution.

Figure 8: ERAM Systems Engineering Activities (Wirthlin, 2009: 318)
Triangular Distributions
All ERAM processes, relevant to this research, are populated with triangular
distributions as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Task Block Triangular Distribution
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Defining a triangular distribution requires definition of a minimum, mean, and maximum
value. This type of distribution was utilized because SMEs were easily able to estimate
the minimum, mean, and maximum time required to complete a process based on their
personal experience. All the processes and activities relevant to this research project were
constructed from SME opinion. If real data could be collected, it could increase the
validity of ERAM.
Historical Data
Historical schedule data for ACAT I, II, and III programs were desired for
validation purposes. The Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval
(DAMIR) and SMART databases were identified by SMEs as possible sources of the
desired data. The author’s request for DAMIR access was denied but SMART access was
granted. Unfortunately, the author experienced technology problems with the SMART
application and no data was collected. Data from Wirthlin’s research on program
schedule times from MS B-C were available and utilized. Test mission data and factors
which resulted in cancelations, aborts, test mission effectiveness, and other metrics were
received from a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB). The test mission data
were imported into Microsoft Excel in order to construct model probability inputs of
categorical factors identified during the SME discussions. The test mission data are
labeled “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) and are not included in this research paper. If
the reader would like a copy of the data, please contact a member of the research team
whose contact information is provided in the Appendix.
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SME Discussions
Purposeful sampling was utilized to select possible SMEs who were familiar with
the DT&E activities. These individuals were contacted through phone calls and email.
Semi-formal discussions were conducted between the author and SMEs who were
available to participate in the research. A list of general discussion topics can be found in
the Appendix. If the SME was in the local area, the author conducted the discussion in
person at the SMEs office. If the SME was not local, the discussion was conducted over
the phone with supporting documents provided through email. Although a predetermined
set of topics were utilized to initiate and direct the discussions, conversations were
allowed to deviate. SME answers were transcribed on paper by the researcher. At the end
of the discussion, SMEs was asked to provide contact information for any additional
references that may be able to provide additional information or have interest in this
research. This proved to be a very useful technique and how a majority of the SMEs were
identified.
The discussions with SMEs were the most enlightening source of knowledge for
this research. Issues only hinted at in literature were discussed frankly without the need
for political correctness allowing a different perspective of DT&E. The next few pages
will present quotes from SMEs which were particularly enlightening and relevant to this
research.
Almost all of the SMEs identified unrealistic schedule expectations as the most
common and significant source of DT&E program delay. Poor quality estimates were
mentioned to originate from both the SPO and DT&E communities. Several DAU SMEs
discussed how this trend may be linked to official policy that is not always as cohesive or
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direct as required in regard to dealing with planning for problems. “Policy does not direct
planning for a problem. We plan for success with minimum schedule” commented one
SME. Interestingly, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) directly addresses this
observation (2012: 52):
“Experience indicates that most programs use a success based timeline when
planning the integrated program schedule, meaning that each event or activity is
based on positive results and moving to the next activity or phase of the
acquisition effort. Experience also indicates that this concept is a major fault in
most program planning.”
Another issue is the limited number of test resources available. The following quotes
reveal how a limited number of test resources (test personnel and dedicated test aircraft)
can cause interdependencies between test programs and outside organizations (not a
DT&E organization) negatively impacting schedule.
“We are constantly trying to find qualified test personnel. It is forcing me
to borrow people [from other test organizations] in order to execute my
own tests. Now my test is dependent on whether or not someone outside
my organization is available. Luckily, we have a pretty good relationship
with those organizations and they are in the same boat as us. They help us
when they can and we do the same. However, I’ve been here long enough
to know it is not always like that.” (RTO SME)
“We don’t own our test aircraft. When we want to execute a test we have
to coordinate with the ops guys to get one of their birds. Sometime our
tests last a few weeks and we need the aircraft the entire time. But they
have a mission to do as well. They don’t want to give up a bird for that
long and they own it so if they don’t want to or need it for something else,
we don’t test unless the test is important enough that we start climbing the
chain [of command] and get one of them to set the priority. It’s a constant
struggle. And when we do get one, they don’t give us their best aircraft,
they give us the one that is having maintenance issues. So now I’m
fighting maintenance issues while trying to execute test.” (RTO SME)
“The RTO gave us a schedule estimate about a year out. Problem was we
ended up a low priority program and we were constantly fighting for range
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time which we never got. It took longer to get done than we first thought.”
(SPO SME)
The next quote reveals how acquisition leadership can encourage negative
behavior. Although not directly a process issue, it reveals how acquisition reform
will have to address cultural issues in addition to process reform.
“We try to plan for bad things to happen, but when I take that padded
schedule to senior leadership, I get punched in the face for planning for
failure so I take it out or try to hide it in other places. Funny thing is, when
bad things do happen, I get punched in the face by the same leadership
because my schedule slipped.” (SPO SME)
Another common theme discussed with several of the DT&E SMEs was poor test
item quality resulting in unplanned, additional work to fix and test the configuration
changes. There were two aspects identified: initial test item problems which occurred
before test execution and test item deficiencies discovered during test execution. The next
quote discusses how many test items are brought to the RTO in less than optimal
conditions and how schedule may be impacted.
“The reality is when a customer comes to us with a poor test item and we
find problems, we don’t just give it back to them and tell them to fix it on
their own and bring it back. That doesn’t help the customer or the
warfighter. So we find the problem, then fix it, test it, then we find another
problem, we fix that problem, then test that problem, and this goes on until
we finish. It is not the most efficient way to execute test because we end
up spending a lot of time fixing and testing the problems we find. Is it our
[DT&E community] fault that the test item was of poor quality? No. The
customer brought us a bad test item to begin with. We are merely the
messenger of bad news and they [the SPO] are trying to shoot the
messenger.” (DT&E SME)
“If we are consistently finding problems with the test item, 90% of the
time the program is behind schedule, over budget, or both.” (DT&E SME)
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The DAG states “Although T&E is best managed as event-driven, in most cases it
is not practical in practice” (DAG, 2012: 52). Several SMEs supported the DAGs
observation.
“Test should be event driven, but in reality we do not always follow that.
Especially with larger programs, the SPO comes to us and tell us how long
we have to test. Right now I am fighting with the **** program because
they gave us *** months to test. I really need *** months to adequately
test this system. The truth is we will test what we can test in that time, find
and fix as many of the deficiencies as we can, and the SPO will hope that
we don’t find any big issues that delay the program. As for the less
important deficiencies, most will just get fixed along the way. Sometimes
though, one will get buried or carried to the next phase of testing. The
program has the support and need to push its way through. But when they
give me half the time I need to properly test the system and its gets pushed
through to OT, is it really our fault that problems are discovered in OT
that we would have found had I been given the time I requested?” (DT&E
SME).
When the SME indicated that deficiencies were buried, clarification was requested.
“We only find deficiencies and report them. It is up to the SPO to decide
whether or not to fix them. For really big problems, the SPO will fix these
because they can be show stoppers. But for smaller problems that don’t
seem to have a large impact on the system, sometimes they are played
down as unimportant, do not get fixed, and are swept under the rug as
unimportant. However, later in OT the problem surfaces, only this time the
OT guys think it’s a big problem and are upset with us [RTO] because we
didn’t find the problem. Well, truth is we actually did find it and reported
it, but the SPO downplayed or hid it because they didn’t want to spend the
time or money to fix it.” (DT&E SME)
One SME postulated that the location of DT&E in the acquisitions cycle may be a
source for delay. Located at the end of a program’s life cycle, by the time the programs
arrives at DT&E, any delay potentially planned for and built into the schedule has been
utilized in other phases of acquisition and must have unrealistic performance results in
order to finish on time. In the AF, generally the RTO will direct what testing needs to be
accomplished and is supportive of more thorough testing (which takes time and costs
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money) while the SPO must balance cost, schedule, and performance objectives which
rarely allow for thorough system testing. The SPO and RTO objectives are contentious
and can result in a hostile relationship between the SPO and DT&E community.
“Test falls in a poor location on a programs schedule. Program schedules
are planned and approved sometimes years in advance and they [SPO] try
to take into account schedule delays. They lay it out and it all looks nice
with plenty of time for everything. But then there is a problem with
manufacturing, the software is late, and then something else takes longer
to fix than anticipated. All these eat up schedule and if it takes too long it
eats schedule from somewhere else. By the time the program gets to test
all that padding is gone, the money is tight, and they hope nothing goes
wrong. I see hope as a risk management strategy way too often.” (DT&E
SME)
SME Demographics
The SMEs that participated in this research were required to have experience in
either the System Program Office (SPO) or DT&E community. Unfortunately,
individuals in the SPO community with PM experience and interest in participating
proved to be challenging as they tended to be higher ranking individuals, busy, and a
majority politely declined to participate. It is worth noting that at this particular point in
time the government shutdown of 2013 had just concluded. Had this event not occurred,
interest from the SPO community may have been greater. Regardless, two SPO SMEs
with PM experience participated in this research. The response from the DT&E
community was more positive and consisted of the majority of SME demographics.
These individuals were GS-15/ Lieutenant Colonel and below personnel. In total, eleven
SMEs participated in this research which included active duty/ retired Army and AF
officers, DAU professors, RTO test conductors, SPO managers, and RTO test directors.
The experience ranged from over twenty-five years of acquisition experience (one of the
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PMs) to four years (for a RTO test conductor). All SMEs had spent time executing test,
one had written AF test policy, three were DAU T&E professors, and three had worked
in a program office. Many of the individuals were identified through snowball sampling.
SME Discussion Summary
The SME discussions brought to light several issues which may contribute to
DT&E program delays. Initial schedule estimates are created and approved long before
test execution occurs which may not be representative of the program once it reaches
DT&E. SPO estimates appear to be overly optimistic possibly due to senior leadership
cultural issues. For those programs that do plan for delays, the estimated delay is still
optimistic due to problems encountered early in the acquisition lifecycle which supports
overly optimistic DT&E schedule. RTO estimates are based on current organizational
manning and resource conditions which may not be representative of the future state at
the time the program arrives at DT&E. In addition, substandard test item quality may be
forcing the RTO to execute a suboptimal test management methodology (fly, fix, fly)
with limited resources in order to provide the warfighter a system of limited capability
sooner rather than a perfect solution later. Unfortunately, differing opinions on what
deficiencies require additional schedule to address can be motivated by the good intention
of getting a weapon system to the warfighter as soon as possible but at the risk of
overlooking or missing a critical deficiency. These observations originate from a small
sample population of the acquisition community, with a majority originating from the
DT&E perspective, and do not necessarily represent the general consensus of the
acquisition community. Even if the opinions presented here represent a sound basis of the
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acquisition community, they are purely subjective in nature. A quantitative method of
analyzing DT&E activities and delays was required.
DT&E Conceptual Model
The knowledge obtained from the Chapter II was utilized as a foundation to
identify critical DT&E activities and significant delays for creation of an initial
conceptual model. The author’s initial intent was to create a one-one process model,
modeled at the PEO level of abstraction, with simulation capabilities. A breakthrough in
creating the conceptual model came during review of the APM. As mentioned in Chapter
II, there were several similarities between the APM and ERAM including that both
modeled the AF DAMS processes. The major difference between the two models was
APM was a process model which did not have simulation capabilities. Realizing the
potential to transform APM into a simulation based model, the initial plan was to utilize
the APM as an initial starting point to build a simulation model of the DT&E processes.
The author chose to model from a top down approach supported by Banks
(2005:14). Based on the APM, the DT&E processes and their relationships to other
acquisition processes were identified and assembled into a conceptual model. Several
challenges were encountered during the course of creating a conceptual model due to the
software ERAM was created in and ERAMs graphical size. None of the SME had access
to Arena software and due to ERAM’s size and complexity, it was impractical to transfer
the design onto common software found on government furnished computers. This
supported creation of a conceptual model in Microsoft Visio which all the SMEs had
access to. After the first conceptual model was created, discussions with SMEs were
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accomplished to check the model’s validity. During the discussions, it became apparent
that a majority of the conversations were focused on processes and interactions not
displayed in the conceptual model of this research but contained in other areas of ERAM.
After several iterations of refining and verification of the model with SMEs, the size and
complexity of the conceptual model increased to the point there was concern if the
research project would finish on schedule. The research scope was narrowed to only
focus on DT&E execution activities. In addition, the majority of the research project
delay was attributed to verifying the process model. However, a process model was not
required to answer the investigative questions and seen as replicating Wirthlin’s original
work, the author chose not to structure the simulation model as a process model. This
approach was supported by the idea that “It is not necessary to have a one-to-one
mapping between the model and the real system. Only the essence of the real system is
needed” (Banks, 2005: 14). This decision simplified the model considerably. A figure of
the conceptual model is available in the Appendix. Several iterations of SME discussions
and modifications to the model were required in order to arrive at a general consensus
that the model reasonably represented the system in reality. At this point, the conceptual
model was considered to have face validity.
DT&E Simulation Model
The conceptual model was translated into a simulation model in the Arena
software separate from ERAM 1.0 in order to decrease verification and simulation run
time. The separate model is referred to as the DT&E Model (DTEM). Several iterations
of model building, inputs from SMEs, and refinement were conducted resulting in the

30

final DTEM version as presented in Figure 10. A detailed description of the model is
available in the Appendix. Chapter IV will assess model validity and investigate DT&E
activities and delays through interventions to assess activity/ delay significance at the
system level.
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Figure 10: Final DTEM
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IV. Analysis and Results
DTEM
Assumptions
Several model assumptions were required for model abstraction and
simplification of several concepts and activities. ERAM 1.0 assumptions were
incorporated into DTEM for consistency and model integration purposes. The most
relevant ERAM 1.0 assumptions were: the entity passing through the model is a program
which can be represented by an ACAT dependent number of required test missions and
there are no memory effects in the model (Wirthlin, 2009: 148-149). DTEM assumptions
were constructed with input from SMEs and are listed below:
•

Backup missions are executed the same day as the primary mission. In reality,
backup test missions are not necessarily executed on the same day as the primary
as a risk management technique.

•

A single backup mission is planned for every primary mission. In practice,
depending on the criticality of a test mission, several backup missions could be
scheduled. However, this assumption simplified the model while still capturing
the intent of backup missions.

•

Each test mission is independent of any test missions.

•

If a test mission is more than 60% effective, it will not execute a backup mission.

•

At least one and no more than five days of testing will occur each week.
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•

The historical test mission data utilized in constructing the DTEM are valid
representation of the reality. Three SMEs (collocated at the MRTFB where the
test mission data were collected) discussed how the test mission data are purely
representative of the people who report the data and the process may incentivize
reporting optimistic values or conducting unorthodox behavior to improve
organizational performance statistics.
“If we have an aircraft problem early in the day, maintenance will push the
test mission right hoping that there will be bad weather in the afternoon. If
weather occurs, then maintenance will cancel the test mission which now gets
labeled as a weather cancel when it was really a maintenance cancel” (DT&E
SME)

This behavior could potentially skew the data and model results. However, the
average data values utilized in the model were discussed with DT&E SMEs, from the
same MRTFB where the test mission data was collected, who did not observe any
gross abnormalities.
DTEM Verification
Verification of the DTEM model was accomplished through several of Arena’s
built in verification capabilities. When executing a simulation, Arena will ensure all
blocks in the model are appropriately connected, populated with parameters, and defined.
If any of these conditions are not met, Arena will display an error window identifying the
category of error and location. The model cannot be executed until all issues are
corrected. Arena also has the capability to display variables, processes, statistics and
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other categories as a group in a single spreadsheet. This allows for easy verification that
all items have the correct units, logical expression, or parameters. In addition, the user
may display values for variables/ statistics while stepping through the simulation. By
utilizing animation and displaying the current value variables at each step in the
simulation, the user can observe the simulation progress, verify the models mathematical
logic, and ensure the reports generated at the end of the simulation were displaying the
correct values. If an anomaly occurs during the simulation run (such as division by zero)
Arena will terminate the run and display a warning window identifying the type, time,
and location of the issue. Several iterations of model refinement and calibration utilizing
the techniques discussed were required before the model would run error free with no
unusual results or observed behavior. At this point the model was verified.
DTEM Validation
No historical data for ACAT DT&E schedules were available for this research.
However, historical data from Wirthlin’s research regarding program schedule from MS
B-C were available and utilized once DTEM and ERAM 1.0 were integrated. Two
aspects of validation are presented: face validity of DT&E execution time, ERAM 3.0
MS B-C time.
DTEM Face Validity
DTEM exports data files of user specified system performance parameters and
ACAT time spent in test execution. These data were imported into Microsoft Excel 2007
and analyzed using Excel’s Analysis Tool-pack. Histograms and descriptive statistics
were compiled (Figures 11-15) and presented to SMEs who reviewed the results
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providing confidence in model face validity. SME feedback on the DTEM results was
positive. The comments ranged from “They look good” and “The histograms look
realistic considering all of the variables that come into play” to “The histograms do seem
to tell a story.” Based on the comments from SMEs, DTEM results were considered to be
a representation of reality accrediting DTEM with face validity. The next step was to
integrate DTEM into ERAM 1.0 and statistically compare ERAM 3.0 (the integrated
DTEM and ERAM 1.0 model) to the historical data gathered from Wirthlin’s research.

Figure 11: DTEM ACAT I Schedule
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Figure 12: DTEM ACAT II Schedule

Figure 13: DTEM ACAT III Schedule
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Figure 14: DTEM Effective Test Mission Growth

Figure 15: DTEM Average Number of Effective Test Missions Executed in One Day
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ERAM 1.0 and DTEM Integration
Integration efforts provided confidence that no unintended configuration changes
occurred in merging ERAM 1.0 and DTEM. While creating DTEM, ERAM 1.0 interface
boundaries were investigated starting with identification of ERAM DT&E activities and
their operations within the model. The DT&E activities of interest are contained in the
red system boundary in Figure 16.

Figure 16: ERAM 1.0 DT&E Activities
Discussions with Wirthlin were conducted to verify the block and variable
operations and how they could potentially impact integration efforts. Exploratory runs
with adjusted activity distributions were conducted on ERAM 1.0 in order to increase
39

confidence in their relationships and operations. The final integrated model, ERAM 3.0,
replaces the blocks contained in the red system boundary in Figure 16 with a single,
hierarchical block labeled “DTEM.”
ERAM 3.0 and ERAM 1.0 Analysis
The program time spent in DT&E activities for ERAM 3.0 and ERAM 1.0 were
analyzed. Details of the analysis (including histograms/ cumulative distributions of the
data, KS Test Results, and a table of percent differences between the models for each
ACAT category) are available in the Appendix. KS tests concluded that the two models
were statistically different for each ACAT category.
ERAM 3.0 Validation
Hypothesis testing with the unequal variance student t-Test were utilized to
calculate ERAM 3.0 validity with respect to the historical data. The student t-Test
requires the assumption that sample data are assumed to be approximately normally
distributed. The test calculates a t-statistic and compares it to a critical value obtained
from a t-Test table which indicates if there is enough information to support rejection of
the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis, Ho, is that the difference between the ERAM 3.0
sample mean and the historical data sample mean is zero. The calculated t-statistic
utilizes the means of each sample ( X ), an estimate of each sample’s standard deviation
(S), and the number of observations for each data set (n). The t-Test equation is shown in
(1). The subscripts delineate between the two sample sets and were assumed to have
unequal variances. Equation (2) is calculates degrees of freedom (df).
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(Banks, 2005: 438)
If the calculated t-statistic is greater than the critical t-statistic (or p-value less
than 0.05), there is strong evidence to support rejection of the null hypothesis. Otherwise
there is not enough information to support a statistical difference between the means of
the two data sets. Wirthlin collected a limited data sample of historical program schedule
from MS B-C (2009: 132-133) which were compared to the equivalent time frame in
ERAM 3.0. A total of 10, 000 replications were utilized to construct the model data
samples (Wirthlin, 2009: 137). Histograms and t-Test results of the historical and ERAM
3.0 data are presented in the following pages for each ACAT grouping. Figures 17-18 and
Table 2 are the results for the All ACAT category.
Under the null hypothesis, Ho, there was a significant difference between the
ERAM 3.0 and the historical data for the All ACAT category based on the results in
Table 2. The analysis was repeated for the individual ACAT categories. The ACAT I
results are presented in Figures 19-20 and Table 3.

41

Figure 17: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 All ACAT MS B-C Schedule

Figure 18: Historical Data All ACAT MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 139)
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Table 2: All ACAT MS B-C t-Test Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Historical Data
Model Data
Mean
1620
2334
Variance
991072
601220
Observations
20
2602
df
19
T Critical
2.09
T Calculated
3.20
P -Value
0.00

Figure 19: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 ACAT I MS B-C Schedule
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Figure 20: Historical Data ACAT I MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 141)
Table 3: ACAT I MS B-C t-Test Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Historical Data
Model Data
Mean
1801
3297
Variance
1435250
417191
Observations
12
645
df
11
T Critical
2.20
T Calculated
4.32
P -Value
0.00

Results in Table 3 show a significant difference between the means of ERAM 3.0
and historical data for the ACAT I category and the null hypothesis was rejected. The
ACAT II analysis is presented in Figures 21-22 and Table 4.
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Figure 21: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 ACAT II MS B-C Schedule

Figure 22: Historical Data ACAT II MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 143)
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Table 4: ACAT II MS B-C t-Test Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Historical Data
Model Data
Mean
1476
2363
Variance
422276
217613
Observations
4
340
df
3
T Critical
3.18
T Calculated
2.72
P -Value
0.07

A p-value of 0.07 dictated that the null hypothesis was not rejected for the ACAT
II category. Figures 23-24 and Table 5 display the ACAT III results.

Figure 23: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 ACAT III MS B-C Schedule
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Figure 24: Historical Data ACAT III MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 145)
Table 5: ACAT III MS B-C t-Test Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Historical Data
Model Data
Mean
1224
1945
Variance
224564
234093
Observations
4
1617
df
3
T Critical
3.18
T Calculated
3.04
P -Value
0.06

The null hypothesis was not rejected for the ACAT III category. The analysis
results for comparing the program schedule from MS B-C for ERAM 3.0 and the
historical data is summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6: Summary of Results
t-Test Results
ACAT Group
p-value
Result
ALL
0
Reject Ho
I
0
Reject Ho
II
0.07
Fail to reject Ho
III
0.06
Fail to reject Ho
A second iteration of model refinement and data collection would have been
beneficial in addressing the ERAM 3.0 validity for ACAT I and All ACAT categories,
but there was not adequate project schedule to accomplish this. However, based on the
available sample data, ERAM 3.0 was valid for ACAT II and III programs. For academic
purposes, this level of model validity was adequate to continue the research. Next, the
author will demonstrate how acquisition reform policies may be simulated in ERAM 3.0
to quantitatively support policy implementation in reality and further characterize
DT&E’s role in acquisitions.
ERAM 3.0 Interventions
This section demonstrates how potential acquisition reform policy may be
executed in ERAM 3.0 and the resulting impacts analyzed to support reform
implementation. Referred to as interventions, ERAM 3.0 was modified in an explicit
method with results compared to the baseline ERAM 3.0 data through hypothesis testing.
A one tailed, unequal variance t-test was utilized. The null hypothesis for all
interventions was: “The difference between the intervention mean and baseline mean is
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0.” The interventions were chosen based on discussions with SMEs and a select few
identified by Wirthlin as having unexpected results in ERAM 1.0. The interventions are
based on concepts of improved program quality, test item quality, test item quantity, and
RTO resource availability. Table 7 provides a list of the different types of excursion that
are investigated. The t-Test analysis was only conducted for the All ACAT category. The
results are presented in tabular format with additional information regarding the
differences between the model’s descriptive statistics available in the Appendix.
Table 7: All ACAT Interventions Summary

Intervention
TRR
SVR
RTO Test Resource Availability
Test Item Quantity
Additional Test Missions
Decrease Maximum Delay to First Test
Mission
Decrease Test Item Deficiencies
Aggregate

Program Test Item Test Item RTO Resource
Quality Quality Quantity Availability
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

TRR Intervention
ERAM 1.0 concluded that the TRR activities did not significantly impact program
schedule. This result was surprising because SMEs indicated scheduling of test ranges
was a significant source of program delay (Wirthlin, 2009: 189). For this intervention in
ERAM 1.0, Wirthlin adjusted the probability of passing the TRR from 70% to 100%
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which represented an increase in the quality of a program. The same intervention strategy
was executed in ERAM 3.0 where the baseline value of 90% successes was adjusted to
100%. The results of the t-test (p-value of 0.41), shown in Table 8, indicate that there is
not enough evidence to support rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence
level. This supports Wirthlin’s original conclusion that the TRR is not a critical activity
for acquisition programs in regards to program schedule. The increase in the intervention
mean in Table 8 is attributed to the insignificance of the activity combined with the
stochastic nature of the model because the value remains within the standard error.
Table 8: TRR Intervention Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4243
Variance
2867719
2885263
Observations
6582
6592
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13172
t Stat
-0.21
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.41
t Critical one-tail
1.64

SVR Intervention
The SVR ensures that programs have adequately conducted DT&E and addressed
major test item deficiencies with a baseline probability of 85% passing the review.
ERAM 1.0 implemented the intervention with the acquisition reform concept of programs
adequately addressing all test item issues before the SVR resulting in a 100% probability
of passing the review. The same intervention strategy was implemented in ERAM 3.0
where the baseline value of 95% was increased to 100%. The results are in Table 9.
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Table 9: SVR Intervention Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4233
Variance
2867719
2874276
Observations
6582
6594
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13174
t Stat
0.12
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.45
t Critical one-tail
1.64

The two tailed t-Test resulted in a p-value=0.45 meaning that there was not
enough evidence to support rejection of the null hypothesis and the difference between
the baseline and intervention data are insignificant. This result supports SMEs
observations that indicated that by the time a program arrives to the SVR there is a very
high probability that it will pass regardless of whether there are still deficiencies. The
DAMS supports pushing a less capable product to the warfighter in less time than
providing the 100% solution in a longer time frame. This concept is sometimes referred
to as the “%80 solution” in the acquisition community.
RTO Test Resource Availability Intervention
SPO SMEs indicated that many programs experienced significant program
schedule delays because of a lack of RTO test resources while executing tests. This delay
factor included priority conflicts over test ranges (the factor most commonly mentioned),
RTO test personnel, test range personnel, maintenance, test support aircraft, and other
RTO test infrastructure. The acquisition reform this intervention represents in reality
would be the procurement of more test ranges, test personnel, maintenance personnel, test
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support aircraft, and other RTO test infrastructure to decrease the probability of delays
due to this factor. For this intervention, the probability that a test mission cancelation or
abort occurs is reduced from the baseline value (FOUO) to 0%. The results are
summarized in Table 10.
Table 10: RTO Test Resource Intervention Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4247
Variance
2867719
2881313
Observations
6582
6574
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13154
t Stat
-0.32
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.37
t Critical one-tail
1.64

The p-value is 0.37 and the null hypothesis was not rejected. The availability of
RTO test resources during test execution does not significantly impact program schedule
to MS C. This result is surprising considering the number of SMEs who indicated that
there was an availability issue with RTO test infrastructure resources significantly
impacting programs. This result warrants further investigation and is discussed in Chapter
V.
Additional Test Missions Intervention
Several DT&E SMEs addressed how additional test schedule would be of value to
address test item deficiencies. How much more time could be spent in DT&E without
significantly impacting the programs schedule to MS C? This time could be utilized to
execute additional test missions and potentially find more test item deficiencies resulting
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in a higher quality weapon system delivered to the warfighter in statistically the same
amount of time. This intervention was executed by increasing the initial required number
of test missions required to progress through DT&E by 10%. The intervention results are
in Table 11.
Table 11: 110% Additional Test Missions Intervention Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4284
Variance
2867719
2941144
Observations
6582
6596
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13175
t Stat
-1.57
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.06
t Critical one-tail
1.64

This intervention did not have a statistically significant impact on the program
schedule (p-value = 0.06) indicating that a program could execute 10% add test missions
without significantly impacting schedule. The intervention was repeated at 115% (results
in Table 12) which had a significant impact to on schedule and the null was rejected. This
set of interventions indicated that a program could be required to execute between 10%15% addition test missions without significantly impacting schedule to MS C.
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Table 12: 115% Test Missions Required Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4306
Variance
2867719
2980340
Observations
6582
6604
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13181
t Stat
-2.32
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.01
t Critical one-tail
1.64

Decrease Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Intervention
After passing the TRR, SMEs identified a delay before test execution begins and
was attributed to several factors including poor test item quality, delay due to test range
availability, and the RTO technical reviews. These delays are represented by a single
abstract process block, “Delay to First Test Mission,” with a triangular distribution of (1,
30, 365). SMEs indicated that the maximum value in the distribution was representative
of poor test item quality and RTO test range unavailability. If better quality test items
were produced through use of technology with higher technology readiness levels,
increased systems engineering efforts earlier in acquisitions, better-trained personnel, and
other engineering practices then the maximum observed value in the triangular
distribution could be decreased. In this intervention, the maximum delay is decreased to
45 days. This value was suggested by SMEs as the maximum delay to complete the RTO
technical reviews without any RTO test resource or test item issue delays. This decrease
was acknowledged to be unrealistic but was a practical starting point because if this value
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was found insignificant, then no values between 45 and 365 would be either. Intervention
results are summarized in Table 13.
Table 13: 45 Days Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4148
Variance
2867719
2854192
Observations
6582
6574
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13154
t Stat
3.01
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.00
t Critical one-tail
1.64

The intervention results reject the null hypothesis and the two models are
statistically different. A program will save 2% of schedule time (see analysis results in
Table 33 in the Appendix) to MS C if the program can decrease the maximum amount of
time to the execution of the first test mission to 45 days. However, decreasing the
maximum delay to 45 may be unrealistic. Another intervention was simulated with the
max delay adjusted to 182.5 or 50% of the baseline. Table 14 contains the results.
Table 14: 182.5 Days Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4185
Variance
2867719
2850115
Observations
6582
6601
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13181
t Stat
1.77
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.04
t Critical one-tail
1.64
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This iteration had a significant impact on program schedule (p-value= 0.04) with
a 1% decrease in the mean (see Table 34 in Appendix I). The intervention was repeated
at a maximum delay of 228.125 (or a 37.5% decrease in the baseline). The p-value was
calculated at 0.08 and the t-Test failed to reject the null hypothesis (refer to Table 15).
Table 15: 228.125 Days Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4196
Variance
2867719
2857758
Observations
6582
6570
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13150
t Stat
1.40
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.08
t Critical one-tail
1.64

This set of interventions revealed that a decrease in the maximum delay of the
execution of the first test mission to greater than approximately 200 days will result in a
significant impact to program schedule to MS C.
Test Item Deficiencies Intervention
The most commonly mentioned DT&E program delay factor was overly
optimistic DT&E schedule based on optimal weapon system performance. The historical
test mission data collected tracked test mission cancelation and aborts due to test item
issues. Test deficiencies may also be discovered but not result in a test mission
cancelation or abort. For this intervention, the probability of a cancelation, abort, or
discovery of a test item deficiency was decreased from the baseline values (FOUO) to
0%. Although this value may be unrealistic, it was an efficient analysis technique.
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Decreasing test item deficiencies could be executed in reality through increasing the
quality of test items through more emphasis on early systems engineering activities,
utilization of more mature technologies, early prototyping, and other engineering efforts.
Table 16 summarizes the intervention results.
Table 16: 100% Decrease in Test Item Deficiencies Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4134
Variance
2867719
2737611
Observations
6582
6574
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13148
t Stat
3.54
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.00
t Critical one-tail
1.64

The null hypothesis was rejected at a p-value=0 with a mean decrease of 2% (see
Table 35 in Appendix I). A second iteration was simulated with a value of 50% fewer test
deficiencies.
Table 17: 50% Decrease in Test Item Deficiencies Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4183
Variance
2867719
2781795
Observations
6582
6587
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13164
t Stat
1.85
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.03
t Critical one-tail
1.64
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The models were significantly different (as indicated in Table 17) with a p-value
of 0.03 and the null hypothesis was rejected. The intervention was repeated at a 37.5%
reduction in test item deficiencies and the results are presented in Table 18. A calculated
p-value of 0.08 resulted in failure to reject the null hypothesis. This set of interventions
revealed that a decrease in test item deficiencies between 50%-37.5% would be required
to have a significant impact on program schedule.
Table 18: 37.5% Decrease in Test Item Deficiencies Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
4195
Variance
2867719
2800061
Observations
6582
6608
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13185
t Stat
1.44
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.08
t Critical one-tail
1.64

Test Item Quantity Intervention
For large programs, often there is only a single test article available for testing.
How would having two test articles impact program schedule? This intervention
investigated the idea that if the RTO had sufficient, qualified test personnel and test
infrastructure to effectively execute test missions for two test articles, the number of
potential test missions executed per day would increase by a factor of two. The
intervention results are presented in Table 19. This intervention resulted in significant
difference between models (p-value=0). The mean decreased by 14% (see Table 37 in
Appendix I for analysis).
58

Table 19: Test Item Quantity Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
3655
Variance
2867719
2310744
Observations
6582
6605
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13024
t Stat
20.77
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.00
t Critical one-tail
1.64

Aggregate Intervention
This intervention investigated a system approach to acquisition reform. The
following combination of factors was utilized to provide a realistic combination of
reforms: Maximum Delay to First Test Mission (228.125), Maximum Delay to TRR
(135), TRR (100%), SVR (100%), Test Item Quantity (2), and Test Item Deficiency (25%). The results are shown in Table 20.
Table 20: Aggregate Intervention Results
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Statistic
Baseline
Intervention
Mean
4237
3613
Variance
2867719
2300524
Observations
6582
6603
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
13017
t Stat
22.30
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.00
t Critical one-tail
1.64
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The null hypothesis was rejected at a p-value= 0. This intervention resulted in a mean
schedule decrease of approximately 15% (see Table 38 for analysis).
Intervention Analysis and Results Summary
DTEM increased the fidelity of the ERAM 1.0 DT&E activities further
characterizing DT&E’s role in the DAMS. The higher fidelity DT&E activities enabled
investigation of several interventions attainable by no other practical method. A summary
of the intervention results is available in Table 21.
Table 21: Intervention Results Summary
Intervention
TRR
SVR
RTO Test Resource
Availability
Test Item Quantity

Results

Not significant
Not significant
Not significant

Significant at 2 test items, 14% mean schedule decrease

Additional Test Missions Significant at greater than 10% additional test missions
Maximum Delay to First Significant at greater than 37.5% maximum delay decrease, 2%
Test Mission
mean schedule decrease
Significant at greater than 37.5% decrease in the number of
Test Item Deficiencies
deficiencies, 2% mean schedule decrease
Aggregate

Significant, 15% mean schedule decrease

The Null Program
Previous research by Baldus and others (2013) presented the concept of executing
a null program that “did nothing” which effectively investigated how much time a
program spent in system was due to process. A similar methodology was utilized for this
investigation. DTEM was adjusted to execute a single test mission in order to observe
how much time a program would spend in DT&E executing the process. For this
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intervention, the DT&E time was defined as the time from passing the TRR to passing
the SVR. The results are displayed in Figure 25 and Table 22.

Figure 25: Histogram of DT&E Time to Execute One Test Mission
Table 22: DT&E Time to Execute One Test Mission
Results
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Count
Confidence Level (95%)
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225
1
209
100
10008
951
33
984
10000
2

The 95% confidence interval for executing a single test mission (with 10,000
replications) was calculated to be 224 +/- 2 days. This was a surprisingly high value with
two implications. First, if the results are valid representations of reality, they suggest that
a large amount of program schedule delay is due to the process itself. The same
conclusion was reached by Wirthlin (2008: 211). In addition, this could hint at a possible
acquisition “bottleneck” located at DT&E where programs are waiting in the “DT&E
queue” to conduct testing. However, if the results are not valid, then the large amount of
time required to execute one test missions suggests DTEM requires additional validation
efforts and refinement for executing small numbers of test missions. Future work is
necessary to investigate the validity of this result and is discussed in Chapter V.
Chapter Summary
This research did not exhaust all means by which ERAM may prove beneficial to
the acquisition community nor is it absolute in its results. As shown in this research,
modeling and simulation is an iterative process building upon the foundation of previous
research. Regardless of the initial answers, future work will build upon the previous
expanding ERAM’s capabilities to further demonstrate the utility this tool. The final
chapter will discuss significant findings uncovered during this research project and
aspects of ERAM which warrant additional research.
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V. Conclusions
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this research was to utilize computer modeling and simulation to
increase the fidelity of the DT&E processes with the goal of gaining new insight into
DT&E’s role in acquisition. Through increasing the fidelity of ERAM 1.0, the results of
ERAM 3.0 supported two previous research conclusions and provided a different
conclusion on a third. In addition, based on SME discussions and literature, several
potential DT&E delay factors were identified, characterized in ERAM 3.0, and analyzed
to analyze their significance with respect to program schedule. Chapter V provides
conclusions based on the results and analysis of Chapter IV, areas for future work, and
how this research could potentially impact acquisitions.
ERAM Observations
Poor Test Item Quality
Discussion with SMEs identified two primary potential DT&E program schedule
delay factors: poor test item quality and a lack of RTO test resources. Interestingly,
relevant literature was available on all of the delay factors investigated in this research
and senior leadership appears to be well aware of them. Yet, acquisition reform is not a
new concept (see to Figures 2-3) and continues to take longer than expected. The
apparent ineffectiveness of acquisition reforms may be, in part, due to the DAMS state of
causal ambiguity and long program cycle times. These observations further support the
underlying concept of this research (and Wirthlin’s) that the acquisition community could
benefit from simulation model (similar to ERAM) with the capability of quantitatively
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estimating the impact of acquisition reform initiatives to support senior leadership
decision making.
SPO and DT&E Relationship
All of the individuals who participated in this research expressed a genuine desire
to improve the DAMS. The fundamental objectives, priorities, and perspectives of the
DT&E and SPO communities or organizations are not always the same and at times
conflicting. Discussions with SMEs from both communities offered insights into what
their respective collective believes are primary factors in program schedule delay. Both
communities identified overly optimistic program schedule based on high quality test
items as the most significant and common delay factor. The reality is that test
deficiencies are always discovered and are generally corrected. However, not all
deficiencies are adequately addressed. Pressure to push weapon systems through DAMS
drives sub-optimal test program management and test practices. Interestingly, the SPO
community also identified the DT&E sub-optimal test methodology as a source of delay.
One key document discovered during the literature review investigated the hypothesis
that the “Department’s developmental and operational test communities’ approach to
testing drives undue requirements, excessive cost, and added schedule into programs and
results in a state of tension between Program Offices and the Testing Community”
(Gilmore, 2011). The results of the investigation “found no significant evidence that the
testing community typically drives unplanned requirements, cost or schedule into
programs” and that “programs are most often delayed because of the results of testing,
not the testing itself” (Gilmore, 2011). ERAM 3.0 results supported this conclusion in
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that the results of testing, such as test item deficiencies due to poor test item quality, are a
significant source of program delay and a prime area for future acquisition reform.
RTO Resource Availability
This research investigated two aspects of RTO test resource availability: pre-test
execution and test execution RTO test resource availability. The pre-test execution
availability of RTO test resources (refer to the Maximum Delay to First Test Mission
Intervention) significantly impacted program schedule which, according to SMEs, was
believed to be largely due to a lack of RTO test ranges. However, once the program
entered the test execution phase of DT&E, the RTO test resources did not significantly
impact program schedule (refer to the RTO Test Resource Availability Intervention). The
results suggest that there is a program “bottle-neck” located at DT&E, possibly due to the
large number of programs attempting to utilize a limited number of test ranges, and a
program will experience significant schedule delays here. However, once the program
enters test execution phase it will unlikely encounter significant schedule delays due to
RTO test resource availability. This was an interesting result because the model did not
agree with SME opinion that test resource availability was a significant source of delay
both prior to and during testing. This may be in part due to a skewed local perspective
where RTO test resource availability does in fact significantly impact DT&E program
schedule, but is not significant with respect to schedule to MS C. If the model results are
valid, it further supports the basis for the need of a simulation model (like ERAM) to
assist in educating the acquisition community on the complex relationships within DAMS
and to assist in supporting acquisition reform.
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DT&E Silver Bullet
The most substantial improvement from a single intervention was a 14% decrease
in the average program schedule (up to MS C) based on providing the RTO additional
test items enabling execution of twice as many test missions per day. This intervention
decreased the mean time to MS C by approximately 590 days or 1.6 years. Many other
interventions were also significant, but were limited to less than 2% reduction in the
schedule mean which may by statistically significant, but not practically significant.
Because ERAM 3.0 does not take into account the cost of these interventions, it is
difficult to conclude their financial feasibility. Future work should investigate integration
of the financial domain into the ERAM legacy to broaden its capabilities. Regardless, the
ERAM 3.0 demonstrated how modeling and simulation could be utilized to better
understand system level impacts through implementing local policy reform.
Program Schedule Confidence Intervals
One of the most interesting results of this research can be seen in Figure 25 which
depicts the time required in DT&E to execute a single test mission. The idea that a
program could spend over 200 days in DT&E to execute a single test mission is
staggering. It would be interesting to observe the differences between the execution of
one test mission, progressively increasing the value, and quantifying the point at which
the time required to test additional test missions becomes significantly different. The
results could indicate that the confidence intervals for executing one, five, ten, or more
test missions are statistically the same meaning that on average a small program could
plan to execute more test missions and on average incur a statistically insignificant delay.
In addition, during the literature review two ERAM research vectors were identified
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highlighting how the recent research modified ERAM to focus on single program
prediction estimates rather than system level performance. As was demonstrated with the
execution of a single test mission, DTEM could easily be modified to the single program
prediction research vector. By setting the required number of test missions to a programs
estimate, the stochastic nature of DTEM combined with Monte Carlo analysis will
produce a confidence interval for the a program’s DT&E schedule. This could potentially
be a valuable tool for both the SPO and RTO communities for estimating DT&E schedule
and warrants future research.
Future Research
Model Validation
Modeling and simulation projects are iterative endeavors (Law, 2007: 67) and the
several areas of improvement for this research are discussed below which were selected
by the author as critical deficiencies in the 3.0 research. ERAM briefings were presented
to SAF/AQXC, OUSD (AT&L)/ ARA/OS & FM, DAU, and AFLCMC/AQT who
provided input regarding the research methodology, assumptions, and areas of concern.
ERAM’s validity was the primary concern from these organizations and emanated from
the utilization of SME inputs for a majority of the model input parameters. Combined
with the small historical MS B-C program schedule sample sizes, these organizations
were concerned with ERAMs validity. ERAM was never intended to be utilized in its
current configuration as the tool for senior leaders. Its goal was to demonstrate how
computer modeling and simulation could be utilized in addressing acquisition reform. If
senior DoD leadership desired a tool with the capabilities ERAM demonstrated, then

67

another iteration of ERAM could be executed by a team of acquisition experts who could
create a more valid model than a single doctoral candidate and several masters students
could. However, if ERAM were to be utilized in its current configuration, efforts should
focus on acquiring historical data to replace the SME inputs and collect a larger sample
size to improve ERAM’s validity.
New DoDI 5000.02
An updated version of the DoDI 5000.02 series was released during the writing of
this thesis (USD, 2013). ERAM should be updated to reflect changes in the new DoDI
5000.02 instruction. One of the major changes discussed with SMEs was the ability to
tailor the program’s acquisition plan. This will result in numerous new possible pathways
in ERAM and will undoubtedly impact program schedule. Interestingly, when asked how
DT&E would be impacted by the new instruction, many SMEs indicated that at the test
execution level there will be no change hinting that as much as DTEM is a valid
representation of the current 5000.02 series, it will potentially have the same level of
validity in the updated series. However, any actual impacts the new instruction may have
on DT&E and acquisitions will take several years for programs to cycle through the
DAMS and observe any process changes in reality.
Delay To First Test Mission
The DTEM block “Delay To First Test Mission” was purposefully made, early in
the model building phase, as an abstract representation of several delay concepts in order
to simplify modeling efforts. This resulted in the confounding of several critical delay
factors which were later viewed to have potentially substantial impacts on DT&E
program schedules. If another iteration of model building and calibration was possible,
68

the “Delay To First Test Mission” block should be separated into three parallel processes
representing delays due to RTO technical reviews, initial test item problems, and RTO
test range scheduling conflicts. As was displayed in Chapter IV’s test problem
interventions, several areas of the DTEM model were tested separately when in reality
there would be some interdependency between the processes. Quantifying the
interdependencies between the initial delay due to test item problems and the probability
of finding test problems during test execution could result in even improved program
schedule performance results and reinforce the idea that test item quality is a significant
factor in program schedule delays.
Other MRTFBs
The historical test mission data utilized in this research project was only one of
many MRTFB across the country as shown in Figure 26. It would be interesting to
analyze test mission data from several MRTFBs and compare how test execution delay
factors compared between the MRTFBs. If significant differences were present, it may
suggest that program schedule performance could be MRTFB dependent.
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Figure 26: Map of DoD MRTFBs (DAG, 2012: 150)
Final Thoughts
The ERAM research has demonstrated how modeling and simulation can provide
a powerful analytical capability for supporting acquisition reform. This research
improved the fidelity of the ERAM DT&E activities providing additional quantitative
evidence supporting new insights into how DT&E impacts major defense acquisition
programs. The DAMs is composed of people, process, organizations, cultural, money,
politics, technology, and other risks. These aspects and their complex interactions are
difficult to completely capture in a simulation model. In an academic setting with
restrained resources, a higher fidelity DT&E model (DTEM) was created, increasing the
ERAM DT&E construct from 17 to over 80 blocks. No amount of effort will ever
produce a 100% exact representation of the DAMS, but this is a known limitation of all
simulation. However, the methodology utilized in this research is based on an iterative
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process where future efforts will identify and correct deficiencies converging to a product
capable of supporting acquisition reform. DTEM captured the “essence of the system”
(Banks, 2005: 14), supported previous conclusions by Wirthlin, demonstrated a new
capability for estimating program DT&E schedules, and further refined acquisition
reform analytics. “All models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box, 1987: 424) and this
research is a prime example of how abstracted models can clarify complex processes.
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Appendix A: Example Discussion Topics
T&E Research Discussion Topics
The focus of this research is the “as is” Air Force T&E processes from PreMilestone A to Milestone C. Discussion information will be compiled into an AFIT
Master’s thesis. Your name, official title, or any identification information will not be
used in order to encourage honest responses to the questions and promote discussion. If
you would like to have your name included in this research effort, please let me know.
Background Questions
1. What acquisition jobs have you held?
2. What were the ACAT levels of the programs you were involved with?
3. What T&E activities or reviews have you been involved with?
General T&E Questions
4. What are the major T&E activities in acquisitions?
5. What are the major T&E decisions/reviews?
6. What are the critical T&E documents?
7. What non T&E activities or decisions have large impacts on T&E activities or
decisions?
8. Are there T&E activities where schedule delays are expected to occur?
a. If so, why are schedule delays expected to occur here?
T&E Model Specific Questions
Instructions: Accompanying this document is a Visio file containing the current T&E
process model. The model is constructed of two types of modeling concepts: activities
and decisions. Activities are displayed as rectangles in the flowchart and decisions as
diamonds. As you review the model, please consider the following questions:
9. Are the processes in the correct order? Take into account whether the sequence is
correct as well as whether the process can occur in parallel or series with respect
to other processes.
a. If not, describe the correct order?
10. Are there any T&E decisions/ activities which may have large impacts on a
program’s schedule not represented in the model?
a. If so, describe the activity/ decision and its placement in the model.
11. Are there any areas of the model that can be simplified because they do not
significantly impact a
12. Are there any processes in the model that need to be modeled at a lower level
fidelity because the lower level activity may have a large impact on a program’s
schedule?
a. If so, identify the lower level process and why it can have such a large
impact on schedule.
13. Look at each activity. Does the time required to complete the activity or decision
probability change depending on the program’s ACAT level?
a. If so, acknowledge this by inputting three triangular distributions next to
the appropriate ACAT level in the SME Data Input Excel Sheet.
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b. If the process time is the same regardless of ACAT level, input only one
distribution and put an “X” in the other two ACAT boxes in the SME Data
Input Excel Sheet.
Additional Questions
14. What T&E activities or decisions could you strongly influence?
15. What T&E activities or decisions did you have little influence over?
16. What T&E Phase processes would you concentrate acquisition reform efforts with
the goal of addressing schedule/delay challenges?
17. Are there any questions I have not asked that you think I should?
18. Is there anyone specific that you recommend I interview?
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Appendix B: Final Conceptual Model

Figure 27: DTEM Conceptual Model
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Appendix C: Configuration Control Document
Enterprise Requirements Acquisition Model
Configuration Management Worksheet
This form provides a listing of the development and the changes done on the ERAM Simulation Model. Use the table below to
provide the simulation software used (Arena or ExtendSim), the new version number, the name of the author and
corresponding organization, the date of revision and the description and purpose of changes.
Simulation
Software

Source
Version
Number

Arena

1.0

New Version Implemented
Number
By

3.0

Sutherlin

Org

United States
Air Force
Institute of
Technology

Date

Description of Change

- Integrated DTEM model
into ERAM 1.0 replacing the
following blocks:
- Test Readiness Review
- Check TRR looping
condition
-Determine TRR delay
-TRR Delay PreC
-Determine Cost and
schedule penalties for TRR
Delays
-Developmental system
testing and Live Fire test and
Operational Assessment
testing
-Make Trades?
Check looping condition
-Determine trades delay
Improved
-Trades Delay PreC
fidelity of
Determine cost and schedule ERAM 1.0
penalties for trades delays DT&E activities
03/27/14 -Combined Testing
to enable
-Assign Set close to end
investigation of
SDD contract condition
DT&E delay
-System Verification Review
factors
Set SVR rework
-SVR rework and delay
-Set SVR delay cost and
schedule penalties

-
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Purpose of
Change

Appendix D: Acronym List
ACAT
ADDM
AF
AFSPC/A5
APM
DAE
DAMS
df
DoD
DT&E
DTEM
ERAM
FOUO
GAO
JCIDS
MRTFB
MS
PEO
PM
PPBE
RAMP
RTO
SAE
SMART
SME
SVR
TRR
US

Acquisition Category
Acquisition Document Development Model
Air Force
Air Force Space Command's Directorate of Requirements
Acquisition Process Model
Defense Acquisition Executive
Defense Acquisition Management System
degrees of freedom
Department of Defense
Developmental Test and Evaluation

Developmental Test and Evaluation Model

Enterprise Requirements and Acquisitions Model
For Official Use Only
Government Accountability Office
Joint Capabilities Integrations and Development System
Major Range and Test Facility Base
Milestone
Program Executive Officer
Program Manager
Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution
Requirements and Acquisitions Management Plan
Responsible Test Organization
Service Acquisition Executive
Systems Metric and Reporting Tool
Subject Matter Expert
Systems Verification Review
Test Readiness Review
United States
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Appendix E: DTEM Construct and Input Parameters
The following pages will step through the DTEM and explain in detail the various
blocks, distributions, and model logic. DTEM was created as a separate model with the
intent to integrate it into the ERAM 1.0. In order to accomplish this, key interface blocks
and variables in ERAM 1.0 are present in DTEM which have no impact on the model if
run separately from ERAM but were purposefully retained to support integration efforts.
DTEM may be simulated as a stand-alone model or it may be incorporated into ERAM
1.0 with an adjustment to the “Assign ACAT Level and Number of Required Test
Missions” block which will be discussed later. Unless stated otherwise, the inputs for the
decision blocks will be presented as the percent true. The process time triangular
distributions will be expressed in the order of minimum, mean, and maximum value. The
model is divided into zones in order to provide a readable figure of the model.
Zone 1 (in Figure 28) displays the initial phase of the DTEM. The first activity
block is the “Delay to TRR” block which has a time distribution of 0, 14, and 180. This
block represents the delay period before a program meets the TRR. The block inputs
were provided by SMEs.
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Figure 28: Zone 1
The next activity is the “Pass Program Office TRR” (Figure 28) which has a
probability of %90. The system level TRR evaluates a program’s preparedness for
testing. If the program fails the review, it will proceed to the “TRR Rework Delay” block
which has a triangular distribution of 17.5, 42.5, 70. This block represents the amount of
time required for the program office to address issues identified during the TRR that
caused the review failure. The input parameters were provided by SMEs.
The “Assign ACAT Level and Number of Required Test Missions” block (Figure
28) randomly selects the program ACAT level. The probability of ACAT selection is 24
% for ACAT I, 14% ACAT II, and 62% ACAT III. These probabilities are historical data
collected by Wirthlin (2009; 127).
The “Assign ACAT Level and Number of Required Test Missions” decision
block will direct the program to one of the three assignment blocks: “ACAT Level 1”,
“ACAT Level 2”, or “ACAT Level 3” (refer to Figure 28). Each block contains an
ACAT specific distribution which randomly assigns the baseline number of required test
missions needed to accomplish DT&E. The variable “Total Number of Missions
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Required” is utilized to hold the program in DT&E until the total number of test missions
required is achieved. The distribution were constructed by SMEs and are 88, 175, 385 for
ACAT I, 36, 58, 117 for ACAT II, and 25, 41, 93 for ACAT III. It is important to note
interesting phenomena occurred when asking SMEs to estimate these distributions. The
question asked was, “For an ACAT III program, what is the min, average, and maximum
number of test missions required to successfully complete DT&E?” Anticipating that the
answers would vary, this same question was asked to the same SME on different
occasions. Different answers were received. For example, the same SME provided three
estimates during three different discussions (approximately one week apart) for the
minimum required test missions for an ACAT III program as 1, 30, and 75. In addition,
because this question was referring to the number of test missions completed at the end of
a program, the SMEs were taking into account the test mission growth due to
cancellations, aborts, test mission effectiveness, and other factors which impacted the
number of test missions required. It was necessary to reduce the distribution inputs by the
test mission growth factor the SME was taking into account. SMEs identified that on
average, a program would experience a 30% growth based on the original estimate. The
final values populating the “Total Number of Test Missions Required” are an average of
SME inputs after subtracting 30% for test mission growth.
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Figure 29: Zone 2
The “Delay to First Test Mission” (refer to Figure 29) is the delay a program
experiences after passing the TRR to execution of the first test mission. The block has a
distribution of 1, 30, 365 and was provided by SMEs. This abstract block represents
several potential activities and delays for a program. SMEs discussed that for large
programs, once the test item is delivered to the RTO there may be test item issues
prohibiting test mission execution. These issues must be addressed before the test item
may be operated. Other delays captured by this block are the RTO technical and safety
reviews. The reviews last for several hours and occur at weekly intervals. Exceptions are
made for higher priority programs or special circumstances. A program with a high
quality test item which accomplished the RTO technical reviews in parallel with the TRR
could potentially execute the first test mission one day after a successful TRR. On the
opposite spectrum, a poor quality test item may take up to a year to correct test item
deficiencies before the item is capable of test mission execution.
For large programs, the RTO technical and safety reviews occur regularly for
each stage of testing. These phases of testing occur simultaneously depending upon
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priority, technical risk, safety, and other criteria. This method of test execution allows for
improved control of program schedule when test deficiencies are discovered. Each stage
of testing will be divided into focus areas containing similar testing requirements able to
be executed during a single mission. For example, an aircraft weapon system’s test plan
may include several stages of high and low speed flight test. After completion of several
high speed flight test stages and a test item issue is discovered, it may be reasonable to
execute other low speed or ground test missions in order to minimize schedule delay
while a fix is implemented for the high speed issue. The RTO will attempt to execute
these reviews in parallel with testing of other phases in order to minimize program
schedule delay. Thus, only the first RTO review is accounted for in the model because
the following reviews occur in parallel with testing and are already accounted for. This
model logic was supported by SMEs.
The “DTE Execution Start Time Logic” (refer to Figure 29) routes programs
which fail the “Pass System Verification Review” block (discussed later) around the
“DTE Start Time” block. This keeps the model entity from resetting the “DTE Start
Time” variable set in the proceeding “Start Time” assign block.
The model executes DT&E test missions based on a projected number of test days
executed in a single week (refer to Figure 30). The block “Start Week and Assign
Number of Days Attempt to Execute Test Missions for 1 Week” randomly selects the
number of test missions the RTO will attempt to execute in a single week. This decision
directs the entity towards one of the next five assign blocks based on the probability that
one (1%), two (90%), three (8%), four (0.5%), or five (0.5%) days of testing will be
executed in one week. SMEs provided the probabilities and indicated that programs will
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plan to execute at least one test missions every week eliminating the possibility of
attempting zero. In addition, the probability of executing six or more times a week is not
practical due to manning requirements, work load, data analysis time, and other factors
for that RTO and not included in the model. This aspect of the model is dependent upon
the RTO resources available and could be tailored to a specific organization.

Figure 30: Zone 3
After assigning the number of test days executed in a week, the delay due to non
test days for that week is calculated by the “Days Not Testing Delay” shown in Figure
30. For example, if a program executed two days of testing in one week, five days of nontest days occurred, and the program experienced seven days of total delay.
The “Assign Number Test Missions Conducted For 1 Test Day” (refer to Figure
30) randomly selects the number of test missions the RTO will attempt to execute on a
single day. The probability of executing one test mission is 90%, two is 8%, and three is
2%. These values were constructed from SME input. These probabilities are program/
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RTO resource dependent and representative of aircraft ground/ flight test missions where
there is only one test aircraft.
Once the number of test missions for a single day of test is randomly selected, the
entity will pass through one of the three assign blocks labeled “3 Missions” or “2
Missions” or “1 Mission” as shown in Figure 30. In this block the variable “Missions Per
Day” will track how many test missions are executed in one day. If three test missions
per day is selected, the entity will progress to the “Create 3 Missions” block and three
entities are created representing three test missions. From this point, the model logic is
easier to understand if the program flowing through the model is viewed as a test mission
entity. Each test mission entity will pass independently through DTEM until the
“Combine 1 Days Worth of Testing” block discussed later.
The test mission entity will then progress through test mission cancel blocks as
shown in Figure 31. Each block represents the probability that a test mission is canceled
the day of test mission execution but before test mission execution begins. If a test
mission cancelation occurs, the mission will not contribute towards the total number of
test missions required to complete DT&E. The penalty for a cancelation depends on the
cancel factor which his discussed in the next paragraph. The test mission cancelation data
are based on FOUO historical data and not presented in the research paper.
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Figure 31: Zone 4
The “Test Item Cancel” factor represents problems due to poor quality test
articles. If this block is true, the program will incur a penalty to the total number of test
missions required. The penalty is based on a distribution of 0, 1, 3 test missions which
will be added to the original baseline total number of test missions required variable.
SMEs indicated that test item issues can generally be addressed in parallel with other
testing resulting in no schedule delay. This is the reasoning for a test mission cancelation
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occurring but no program delay is experienced (represented by the minimum value of
zero in the triangular distribution).
The “Weather Cancel” block represents the probability of a test mission
cancellation due to weather. This delay factor does not result in a penalty.
The “Resource Cancel” refers to the cancelation of a test mission attributed to
non-availability of RTO test resources. These resources may include test aircraft, test
personnel, test ranges, ground instrumentation, and other test infrastructure. Programs are
assigned a priority number which is one method utilized to decide which programs
receive resource support. In DTEM, there is no penalty associated with a successful result
in this block.
The “Administrative Cancel” largely represents the concept of scheduling primary
and secondary test missions. For every test mission an RTO plans to execute, a backup
mission is also scheduled as a risk mitigation technique in case the primary mission is
canceled or less effective than required. If the primary mission is a success, the secondary
mission is purposefully canceled by the RTO. The historical data indicated that the
purposeful cancelation of backup test missions by the RTO represents an overwhelming
majority of this block. However, other minor aspects accounted for include: the
possibility of cancelation by senior RTO leadership due to observed safety issues,
unanticipated support of civilian or military events, or other instances where RTO
leadership cancels a test mission. There is no penalty associated with a successful result
of this block.
If a mission is canceled, the entity will progress through one of the respective four
cancel assign blocks in Figure 31. These blocks are used to assign delays and for
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statistical analysis. After the assign block, the entity will attempt to execute a backup test
mission. For each canceled test mission, a single backup test mission is attempted. The
entity will pass through the “Set Cancel Flag” block (utilized for model analysis) and
continue to the “Cancel Backup Test Mission Loop Check” which will direct the entity
based on whether the test mission has already attempted a backup test mission. The
“Backup Mission Flag” block sets the “Backup Test Mission” variable which tracks if a
backup mission has previously been attempted for this particular entity. There is no
schedule penalty associated with executing a backup mission due to the assumption that
the backup test mission is executed the same day as the primary mission.
If a test mission is not canceled, it will proceed to the test mission abort
area of the model, shown in Figure 31, which operates according to similar logic as the
test mission cancelation area. A test mission abort is defined as a test mission that started
test execution but did not finish the mission due to one of four abort factors. The abort
factor decision blocks are populated with FOUO historical data and not presented in this
report. If a mission is aborted, it will proceed to one of the “Test Item Abort,” “Weather
Abort,” “Resource Abort,” or “Administrative Abort” assign blocks which are utilized for
statistical analysis and delay calculation. The “Test Item Abort” block results in a delay
of 0, 1, 3 test missions if true. The other abort assign blocks do not result in a penalty.
The “Set Abort Flag” assign block is utilized for model analysis.
The “Test Item Deficiency Discovered #1” block (refer to Figure 32) represents
the probability a test item deficiency is discovered during a test mission. This probability
was provided by SMEs and has a value of 90%. If a deficiency is discovered, the
probability it results in a delay is calculated by the “Additional Test Missions Required
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#1” block and has a probability of 15%. SMEs indicated that a majority of test
deficiencies are addressed in parallel to other testing efforts to minimize schedule impact.
If a test item deficiency is selected to cause a delay, the “Assign Test Item Issues
Missions Delay #1” block will calculate the additional test missions required based on a
triangular distribution of 0.25, 1, 3. These inputs are SME estimates. The logic and block
values are the same for test missions that do not abort progressing through the “Test Item
Deficiency Discovered #2,” “Additional Test Missions Required #2,” and “Assign Test
Item Issues Missions Delay #2” blocks.
The “Abort Mission Effective?” block (refer to Figure 32) represents the
probability that an aborted mission accomplished any test requirements before the
mission abort occurred. This probability is based on FOUO historical data and not
presented in the report. If the aborted test mission was effective, it will pass through the
“Abort Mission Effectiveness Level” which will randomly select one of five assign
blocks based on its probability of occurrence: “75% Effective” (10%), “50% Effective”
(75%), and “25% Effective” (15%). This model construct was supported and estimated
by SMEs. These blocks represent the reality that a test mission may be executed and test
requirements accomplished before the mission aborted. Test mission effectiveness may
be measured in the number of test points completed compared to the original number of
points planned. For example, if a test mission was executed that planned on executing ten
test points, but only five were executed, the test mission was 50% effective. Thus 0.5
effective test missions were completed and contributed towards the total number of test
missions required to pass DT&E. Each test mission initially has the potential to
contribute one effective test mission to the total number of test missions required to pass
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DT&E. By definition, an aborted test mission did not complete all the test requirements
and cannot be 100% effective.
A test mission that does not cancel or abort will also progress through model logic
to calculate test mission effectiveness. In Figure 32, test mission that are not canceled or
aborted will proceed through the “Mission Effectiveness Level?” block. This block
operates the same as the “Abort Mission Effectiveness Level?” block but with adjusted
effectiveness levels and probabilities: “100% Effective” (10%), “75% Effective” (75%),
and “25% Effective” (10%). Test missions that do not cancel or abort are assumed to be
greater than 0% effective.

Figure 32: Zone 5
If a test mission was 75% effective, it will progress to the “75% Effective Make
Trades?” block (refer to Figure 33). SMEs indicated that for test missions which were not
100% effective, the SPO may decide that the data acquired are suitable for their analysis
and not execute additional test missions to collect the rest of the data. This concept was
referred to as making trades. SMEs provided estimates for these blocks: “75% Effective
Make Trades?” (75%), “50% Effective Make Trades?” (50%), and “25% Effective Make
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Trades?” (25%). If a program is 0%effective, a make trade situation is not possible. If a
trade is able to be made, the “Update Mission Effectiveness Variable” block will assigned
a value of one to the test mission effectiveness variable which will contribute one count
towards the total number of test missions completed. If a make trade situation is not
possible, the test mission entity retains the test mission effectiveness value. The “Update
Total Missions Completed Variable” block updates the total number of effective test
missions completed through the “Total Number of Test Missions Completed” variable.

Figure 33: Zone 6
The “Was Mission Aborted” and “Backup Mission Available?” and “Backup Test
Mission Effectiveness Check” (refer to Figure 34) direct the entity based on whether a
test mission was aborted, less than 60% effective, and has not previously executed a
backup mission. If these criteria are met, a single backup mission is attempted by looping
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through the model. The requirement of a test mission effectiveness level greater than 60%
was provided by SMEs.
The “Reset Flags” (refer to Figure 34) assign block resets the backup test mission,
cancel, and abort flags. These flags control possible entity pathways based on what
events have occurred for that test mission.
If two test missions for a single day was selected in the “Assign Number Test
Missions Conducted For 1 Test Day” (refer to Figure 30), each test mission will progress
independently through the model (starting at the “Create 2 Test Mission” block) until the
“Combine 1 Days Worth of Testing” block (refer to Figure 34). After each test mission
has been canceled, aborted, or successfully completed, it will remain at this location until
all test missions for that day also arrive.

Figure 34: Zone 7
After all test missions are executed for a single day of testing, one day of program
schedule delay occurs in the “Delay for 1 Day of Testing Completed” block. The block
“Update test Days Completed This Week” tracks how many days of testing are
completed each week and will route the entity through the model until all test missions
for a week are completed.
When the total number of test missions completed equals the total number of test
missions required, the block “Test missions Completed vs Required” (refer to Figure 35)
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will direct the program out of test execution and into the final activities in DTEM. If the
total number of completed test missions is less than the total number of required test
missions, the entity will proceed to the “End of 1 Week” decision block. This block
compares the number of completed test days with the number of test days assigned for
one week. If the number of test days for one week of testing is less than the number
assigned, the entity will loop through the model passing through the “Update Variables”
block (which updates the number of test days completed) and the “Missions Left Logic
Check” block. Once less than one test missions is required to complete the test execution
phase of DTEM (difference between the number of test missions completed and number
of test missions required), the “Missions Left Logic Check” block will assign one test
mission for a single day of test. For example, if 300 test missions are required and 299.5
test missions have been completed, DTEM will assign a maximum of one test missions to
a single day of test. This logic prohibits executing two or three test missions to
accomplish 0.5 test missions and potentially skewing the number of test missions
completed. It is possible to complete more test missions than are required due to the
model logic, but by a value less than one. Once the number of test days completed in a
week equals the number of test days assigned for a single week, the block “End of 1
Week” will direct the entity through the “Days Not Testing Delay” and “Update test days
Completed and Assigned This Week” to the “Start Week and Assign Number of Days
Attempt to Execute Test Missions For 1 Week” block. The entity will loop through the
model as previously discussed until the number of test missions completed is equal to the
number of test missions required.
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Figure 35: Zone 8
Once the total number of test missions completed equals the total number of test
missions required, the “Test Missions Completed vs Required” block will direct the
entity to the “Calculate Variables” block which identifies the finish time for test
execution and updates other model variables.
The “Analysis Delay” represents the final stages of test mission data analysis
which will occur at the end of test execution. After a test mission, collected data require
analysis. SMEs indicated that data analysis will occur in parallel with other test efforts
and between test missions. If a specific test mission data require analysis before
execution of the next test mission for that phase of testing, the RTO will attempt analyze
the data between test missions or execute other phases of testing as allowed by priority,
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technical risk, and safety risk in order to minimize schedule delay. Because the data
analysis occurs in parallel with testing, it is included through representation in the test
mission execution time. However, once the last test mission is executed, the time required
to analyze the data must be accounted for which is done in the “Analysis Delay” block.
This block has inputs of 1, 10.5, 90, and was provided by SMEs.
The RTO will create DT&E program reports at regular intervals which provide
the SPO with program performance. These reports incorporate data analysis results. RTO
SMEs indicated that it is standard policy to be allowed up to three months to compile and
finish the final program report after completion of data analysis of the last test mission.
This finalization of the program DT&E report is represented by the “Finish DT Reports”
and has SME inputs of 14, 30, 90.
Next the entity will progress to the “Assign Set Close to end SDD contract
Condition.” This block is from ERAM 1.0 and included in DTEM for integration
purposes. The entity then enters the “Pass System Verification Review” block and has a
probability of 95% of passing the review (based on SME input). SME consensus was that
the likelihood of not passing a SVR is very small because any deficiencies found in
DT&E should have been fixed by this point. It not, the deficiency is usually passed to
next phase of DT&E.
If a program does not pass SVR, it will progress to the “Check SVR Loop”
decision block which observes the number of times a program has failed SVR. SMEs
suggested the probability of failing two SVRs is highly unlikely and excluded from the
model. The “Check SVR Loop” prevents programs from failing the SVR a second time.
If a program has not previously failed the SVR, the entity will progress to the “Update
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Total Number of Missions Required” block. This block calculates a penalty due to
executing additional test missions in order to address the issues which caused the
program to fail SVR. This penalty is determined by a percent of the original total number
of required test missions and is added to the “Total Number of Test Missions Required”
variable. The distribution is 10%, 25%, 50% of the “Initial Total Number of Test
Missions Required.” None of the SMEs were able to provide estimates for this
distribution and the values are author estimates. After a test mission penalty is assigned,
the entity will then proceed to the “Delay to First Test Mission” block previously
discussed where the entity will loop through the model until completing all the required
number of test missions.
If a program does not fail the SVR, the entity will proceed to the “Set DTE Finish
Flag” which is used for statistics collection. The entity will then exit the model and one
DTEM simulation replication is complete. DTEM records a single observation of the user
requested statistics to data files which are utilized for data analysis. Because of the
stochastic nature of DTEM, each replication will result in a different schedule time.
Utilizing Monte Carlo techniques, thousands of programs are executed in DTEM. The
ability to conduct analysis of the compilation of these data is discussed in Chapter IV.
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Appendix G: Statistical Analysis of ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 DT&E Schedule
For the purpose of this analysis section, DT&E time is defined as the time from
entering the “Test Readiness Review” to passing the “System Verification Review” block
in ERAM 1.0 which was instrumented with additional assign blocks and variables in
order to gather the required data. ERAM 1.0 was executed and the respective number of
ACAT programs which progressed though DT&E activities was utilized as the number of
replications for DTEM to ensure an accurate comparison between the two models. It is
important to note that DTEM represents the time programs in ERAM 3.0 will spend in
DT&E. Regardless of whether the data was collected from ERAM 3.0 or DTEM, the
results would be the same. However, due to the research timeline, DTEM was chosen to
be run due to a drastically reduced simulation run time. In addition, a two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test was utilized for this analysis because it is sensitive to
differences in sample distribution characteristics including mean, dispersion, and
skewness (Siegel, 1988: 144). The two-sample KS test compares the maximum absolute
difference between the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for each sample. If the
maximum deviation is greater than the KS critical value, the null hypothesis that the two
samples come from the same population is rejected. For large sample sizes (greater than
25), the critical test statistic is calculated from equation (3) where m and n are the
respective sample sizes.
KS statistic = 1.36
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m+n
mn

(3)

For each ACAT grouping, a histogram and CDF of the time spent in DT&E for each
model is presented followed by a data table with the differences between the descriptive
statistics of the models. Lastly, the results of the KS test and differences between model
descriptive statistics are discussed. The All ACAT grouping data is analyzed first in
Figures 36-37 and Table 23

Figure 36: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 All ACATs DT&E Time
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Figure 37: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 All ACATs DT&E Time
Table 23: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 All ACATs DT&E Normalized Statistics
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median (days)
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Program Count

ERAM 1.0
222.21
1.73
189.66
144.59
20905.12
5.93
1.93
1403.63
32.34
1435.97
6967.00
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ERAM 3.0
725.92
4.54
593.93
378.74
143443.88
2.38
1.60
2845.11
212.87
3057.98
6967.00

% Difference
226.68
161.95
213.15
161.95
586.17
-59.81
-16.83
102.70
558.34
112.96
0.00

The KS Test calculated an absolute maximum deviation b 0.048 with a critical
statistic of 0.023 resulting in a rejection of the null hypothesis. The ACAT I data are
presented in Figures 38-39, and Table 24.

Figure 38: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT I DT&E Time
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Figure 39: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 ACAT I DT&E Time
Table 24: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT I DT&E Statistics
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median (days)
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Program Count

ERAM 1.0
259.21
3.68
223.86
149.94
22482.66
5.45
1.96
1133.55
36.97
1170.52
1660.00
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ERAM 3.0
1295.05
8.14
1263.55
331.79
110086.85
0.61
0.57
2389.97
511.30
2901.27
1660.00

% Difference
399.61
121.28
464.43
121.28
389.65
-88.76
-70.69
110.84
1282.93
147.86
0.00

The KS test results in a maximum deviation 0.1085 with a critical KS statistic of
0.0472 and the null was rejected. The ACAT II analysis is presented in Figures 40-41,
and Table 25.

Figure 40: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT II DT&E Time
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Figure 41: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 ACAT II DT&E Time
Table 25: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT II DT&E Statistics
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median (days)
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Program Count

ERAM 1.0
238.64
4.82
197.31
148.24
21974.91
4.21
1.82
965.23
47.07
1012.30
944.00
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ERAM 3.0
620.90
5.00
603.86
153.72
23628.85
1.75
0.90
1166.29
258.23
1424.52
944.00

% Difference
160.18
3.69
206.05
3.69
7.53
-58.35
-50.79
20.83
448.65
40.72
0.00

The null was rejected based on a calculated KS statistic of 0.0626 and a critical
statistic of 0.1342. Figure 42-43 and Table 26 are the results of the ACAT III analysis.

Figure 42: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT III DT&E Time

Figure 43: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 ACAT III DT&E Time
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Table 26: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT III DT&E Statistics
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median (days)
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Program Count

ERAM 1.0
204.58
2.10
174.78
138.54
19193.29
6.96
2.01
1403.63
32.34
1435.97
4363.00

ERAM 3.0
534.97
2.08
518.19
137.42
18883.33
1.27
0.79
1100.31
212.87
1313.18
4363.00

% Difference
161.49
-0.81
196.47
-0.81
-1.61
-81.78
-60.62
-21.61
558.34
-8.55
0.00

The absolute maximum deviation between the CDFs was 0.1442. This value was
larger than the critical KS statistic of 0.0291 and the null hypothesis was rejected. A
summary of the differences between the model’s descriptive statistics between ERAM
1.0 and 3.0 is provided in Table 27.
Table 27: Summary of Percent Differences Between ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0
All ACAT
% Difference

ACAT I
% Difference

ACAT II
% Difference

ACAT III
% Difference

Mean (days)

227

400

160

161

Standard Error

162

121

4

-1

Median (days)

213

464

206

196

Standard Deviation (days)

162

121

4

-1

Sample Variance

586

390

8

-2

Kurtosis

-60

-89

-58

-82

Skewness

-17

-71

-51

-61

Range (days)

103

111

21

-22

Minimum (days)

558

1283

449

558

Maximum (days)

113

148

41

-9

Exit at MS C
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A summary of the KS Test results is presented in Table 28 indicating that the
ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 are different with respect to all ACAT groupings.
Table 28: KS Test Results Summary
ACAT Group KS Test Result
All

Reject Ho

I

Reject Ho

II

Reject Ho

III

Reject Ho
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Appendix H: Additional Intervention Results Analysis
Table 29: TRR Intervention Results
Exit at MS C

Intervention

% Difference

4237

4243

0

Standard Error

201

21

0

Median (days)

3953

3945

0

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1699

0

2867719

2885263

1

Kurtosis

0.47

0.45

-4

Skewness

0.92

0.92

0

Range (days)

9189

9134

-1

Minimum (days)

1344

1320

-2

Maximum (days)

10534

10455

-1

6582

6592

0

Mean (days)

Sample Variance

Program Count

Baseline

Table 30: SVR Intervention Results
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)

Baseline

Intervention

% Difference

4237

4233

0

Standard Error

21

21

0

Median (days)

3953

3932

-1

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1695

0

2867719

2874276

0

Kurtosis

0.47

0.44

-8

Skewness

0.92

0.91

-1

Range (days)

9189

9134

-1

Minimum (days)

1345

1320

-2

Maximum (days)

10534

10455

-1

6582

6594

0

Sample Variance

Program Count
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Table 31: RTO Test Resource Availability Intervention Results
Exit at MS C

Intervention

% Difference

4237

4247

0

Standard Error

21

21

0

Median (days)

3953

3952

0

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1697

0

2867719

2881313

0

Kurtosis

0.47

0.43

-9

Skewness

0.92

0.91

-1

Range (days)

9189

9005

-2

Minimum (days)

1345

1345

0

Maximum (days)

10534

10350

-2

Mean (days)

Sample Variance

Baseline

Table 32: 110% Additional Test Missions Intervention Results
Exit at MS C

Intervention

% Difference

4237

4284

1

Standard Error

21

21

1

Median (days)

3953

3991

1

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1715

1

2867719

2941144

3

Kurtosis

0.47

0.49

5

Skewness

0.92

0.93

2

Range (days)

9189

9259

1

Minimum (days)

1345

1391

3

Maximum (days)

10534

10650

1

6582

6596

0

Mean (days)

Sample Variance

Program Count

Baseline
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Table 33: 115% Additional Test Missions Intervention Results
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median (days)
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Program Count

Baseline Intervention
4237
4306
21
21
3953
4019
1693
1726
2867719
2980340
0
1
1
1
9189
9617
1345
1371
10534
10987
6582
6604

% Difference
2
2
2
2
4
15
2
5
2
4
0

Table 34: 45 Day Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results
Exit at MS C

Intervention

% Difference

4237

4148

-2

Standard Error

21

21

0

Median (days)

3953

3855

-2

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1689

0

2867719

2854192

0

Kurtosis

0.47

0.44

-6

Skewness

0.92

0.91

0

Range (days)

9189

9148

0

Minimum (days)

1345

1343

0

Maximum (days)

10534

10491

0

6582

6574

0

Mean (days)

Sample Variance

Program Count

Baseline
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Table 35: 182.5 Day Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results
Exit at MS C

Intervention

% Difference

4237

4185

-1

Standard Error

21

21

0

Median (days)

3953

3900

-1

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1688

0

2867719

2850115

-1

Kurtosis

0.47

0.47

0

Skewness

0.92

0.91

0

Range (days)

9189

9634

5

Minimum (days)

1345

1290

-4

Maximum (days)

10534

10924

4

6582

6601

0

Mean (days)

Sample Variance

Program Count

Baseline

Table 36: 100% Decrease Test Mission Deficiencies Intervention Results
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median (days)
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Program Count

Baseline
4237
21
3953
1693
2867719
0.47
0.92
9189
1345
10534
6582
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Intervention
4134
20
3836
1655
2737611
0.30
0.87
8915
1281
10196
6574

% Difference
-2
-2
-3
-2
-5
-36
-5
-3
-5
-3
0

Table 37: 50% Decrease Test Mission Deficiencies Intervention Results
Exit at MS C

Intervention

% Difference

4237

4183

-1

Standard Error

21

21

-2

Median (days)

3953

3885

-2

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1668

-2

2867719

2781795

-3

Kurtosis

0.47

0.4

-14

Skewness

0.92

0.9

-2

Range (days)

9189

9012

-2

Minimum (days)

1345

1263

-6

Maximum (days)

10534

10275

-2

6582

6587

0

Mean (days)

Sample Variance

Program Count

Baseline

Table 38: 37.5% Decrease Test Mission Deficiencies Intervention Results
Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Count

Baseline
4237
21
3953
1693
2867719
0.47
0.92
9189
1345
10534
6582

110

Intervention
4195
21
3895
1673
2800061
0
1
9077
1354
10430
6608

% Difference
-1
-1
-1
-1
-2
-14
-2
-1
1
-1
0

Table 39: Increase Test Item Quantity Intervention Results
Exit at MS C

Intervention

% Difference

4237

3654

-14

Standard Error

21

19

-10

Median (days)

3953

3318

-16

Standard Deviation (days)

1693

1519

-10

2867719

2306163

-20

Kurtosis

0.47

-0.17

-135

Skewness

0.92

0.75

-18

Range (days)

9189

7812

-15

Minimum (days)

1345

1137

-15

Maximum (days)

10534

8949

-15

6582

6604

0

Mean (days)

Sample Variance

Program Count

Baseline

Table 40: Aggregate Intervention Results

Exit at MS C
Mean (days)
Standard Error
Median (days)
Standard Deviation (days)
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range (days)
Minimum (days)
Maximum (days)
Program Count

Baseline
4237
21
3953
1693
2867719
0.47
0.92
9189
1345
10534
6582
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Intervention
3613
19
3280
1517
2300524
-0.17
0.75
8232
1113
9345
6603

% Difference
-15
-11
-17
-10
-20
-135.88
-18.34
-10
-17
-11
0

Appendix I: Research Methodology

Figure 44: Methodology for a Simulation Study (Law, 2007: 67)
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